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Abstract
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a popular framework for modeling combinatorial prob-
lems. However, ASP cannot easily be used for reasoning about uncertain information. Pos-
sibilistic ASP (PASP) is an extension of ASP that combines possibilistic logic and ASP.
In PASP a weight is associated with each rule, where this weight is interpreted as the
certainty with which the conclusion can be established when the body is known to hold.
As such, it allows us to model and reason about uncertain information in an intuitive
way. In this paper we present new semantics for PASP, in which rules are interpreted
as constraints on possibility distributions. Special models of these constraints are then
identified as possibilistic answer sets. In addition, since ASP is a special case of PASP
in which all the rules are entirely certain, we obtain a new characterization of ASP in
terms of constraints on possibility distributions. This allows us to uncover a new form
of disjunction, called weak disjunction, that has not been previously considered in the
literature. In addition to introducing and motivating the semantics of weak disjunction,
we also pinpoint its computational complexity. In particular, while the complexity of most
reasoning tasks coincides with standard disjunctive ASP, we find that brave reasoning for
programs with weak disjunctions is easier.
KEYWORDS: logic programming, answer set programming, possibility theory
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1 Introduction
Answer set programming (ASP) is a form of logic programming with a fully declar-
ative semantics, centered around the notion of a stable model. Syntactically, an
ASP program is a set of rules of the form (head← body) where head is true when-
ever body is true. Possibilistic ASP (PASP) extends upon ASP by associating a
weight with every rule, which is interpreted as the necessity with which we can
derive the head of the rule when the body is known to hold. Semantics for PASP
have been introduced in (Nicolas et al. 2006) for possibilistic normal programs and
later extended to possibilistic disjunctive programs in (Nieves et al. 2013). Under
these semantics, a possibilistic rule with certainty λ allows us to derive head with
certainty min(λ,N(body)) where N(body) denotes the necessity of the body, i.e. the
certainty of head is restricted by the least certain piece of information in the deriva-
tion chain. Specifically, to deal with PASP rules without negation-as-failure, the
semantics from (Nicolas et al. 2006) treat such rules as implications in possibilis-
tic logic (Dubois et al. 1994). When faced with negation-as-failure, the semantics
from (Nicolas et al. 2006) rely on the reduct operation from classical ASP. Essen-
tially, this means that the weights associated with the rules are initially ignored, the
classical reduct is determined and the weights are then reassociated with the corre-
sponding rules in the reduct. Given this particular treatment of negation-as-failure,
the underlying intuition of ‘not l’ is “‘l’ cannot be derived with a strictly positive certainty”.
Indeed, as soon as ‘l’ can be derived with a certainty λ > 0, ‘l’ is treated as true
when determining the reduct. However, this particular understanding of negation-
as-failure is not always the most intuitive one.
Consider the following example. You want to go to the airport, but you notice
that your passport will expire in less than three months. Some countries require that
the passport is at least valid for an additional three months on the date of entry.
As such, you have some certainty that your passport might be invalid (invalid ).
When you are not entirely certain that your passport is invalid, you should still
go to the airport (airport) and check-in nonetheless. Indeed, since you are not
absolutely certain that you will not be allowed to board, you might still get lucky.
We have the possibilistic program:
0.1: invalid ←
1: airport ← not invalid
where 0.1 and 1 are the weights associated with the rules (invalid ←) and airport ←
invalid , respectively. Clearly, what we would like to be able to conclude with a high
certainty is that you need to go to the airport to check-in. However, as the semantics
from (Nicolas et al. 2006) adhere to a different intuition of negation-as-failure, the
conclusion is that you need to go to the airport with a necessity of 0. Or, in other
words, you should not go to the airport at all.
As a first contribution in this paper, we present new semantics for PASP by
interpreting possibilistic rules as constraints on possibility distributions. These se-
mantics do not correspond with the semantics from (Nicolas et al. 2006) when con-
sidering programs with negation-as-failure. Specifically, the semantics presented in
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this paper can be used in settings in which the possibilistic answer sets according
to (Nicolas et al. 2006) do not correspond with the intuitively acceptable results.
For the example mentioned above, the conclusion under the new semantics is that
you need to go to the airport with a necessity of 0.9.
In addition, the new semantics allow us to uncover a new characterization of ASP
in terms of possibility theory. Over the years, many equivalent approaches have been
proposed to define the notion of an answer set. One of the most popular character-
izations is in terms of the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct (Gelfond and Lifzchitz 1988) in
which an answer set is guessed and verified to be stable. This characterization is used
in the semantics for PASP as presented in (Nicolas et al. 2006). Alternatively, the
answer set semantics of normal programs can be defined in terms of autoepistemic
logic (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1991), a well-known non-monotonic modal logic.
An important advantage of the latter approach is that autoepistemic logic enjoys
more syntactic freedom, which opens the door to more expressive forms of logic pro-
gramming. However, as has been shown early on in (Lifschitz and Schwarz 1993),
the characterization in terms of autoepistemic logic does not allow us to treat clas-
sical negation or disjunctive rules in a natural way, which weakens its position as
a candidate for generalizing ASP from normal programs to e.g. disjunctive pro-
grams. Equilibrium logic (Pearce 1997) offers yet another way for characterizing
and extending ASP, but does not feature modalities which limits its potential for
epistemic reasoning as it does not allow us to reason over the established knowl-
edge of an agent. The new characterization of ASP, as presented in this paper, is
a characterization in terms of necessary and contingent truths, where possibility
theory is used to express our certainty in logical propositions. Such a character-
ization is unearthed by looking at ASP as a special case of PASP in which the
rules are certain and no uncertainty is allowed in the answer sets. It highlights the
intuition of ASP that the head of a rule is certain when the information encoded in
its body is certain. Furthermore, this characterization stays close to the intuition
of the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct, while sharing the explicit reference to modalities
with autoepistemic logic.
As a second contribution, we show in this paper how this new characterization of
ASP in terms of possibility theory can be used to uncover a new form of disjunction
in both ASP and PASP. As indicated, we have that the new semantics offer us an
explicit reference to modalities, i.e. operators with which we can qualify a statement.
Epistemic logic is an example of a modal logic in which we use the modal operatorK
to reason about knowledge, where K is intuitively understood as “we know that”.
A statement such as a∨ b∨ c can then be treated in two distinct ways. On the one
hand, we can interpret this statement as Ka ∨ Kb ∨ Kc, which makes it explicit
that we know that one of the disjuncts is true. This treatment corresponds with the
understanding of disjunction in disjunctive ASP and will be referred to as strong
disjunction. Alternatively, we can interpret a ∨ b ∨ c as K(a ∨ b ∨ c) which only
states that we know that the disjunction is true, i.e. we do not know which of the
disjuncts is true. We will refer to this form of disjunction as weak disjunction. This
is the new form of disjunction that we will discuss in this paper, as it allows us
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to reason in settings where a choice cannot or should not be made. Still, such a
framework allows for non-trivial forms of reasoning.
Consider the following example. A SCADA (supervisory control and data acqui-
sition) system is used to monitor the brewing of beer in an industrialised setting. To
control the fermentation, the system regularly verifies an air-lock for the presence
of bubbles. An absence of bubbles may be due to a number of possible causes. On
the one hand there may be a production problem such as a low yeast count or low
temperature. Adding yeast when the temperature is low results in a beer with a
strong yeast flavour, which should be avoided. Raising the temperature when there
is too little yeast present will kill off the remaining yeast and will ruin the entire
batch. On the other hand, there may be technical problems. There may be a mal-
function in the SCADA system, which can be verified by running a diagnostic. The
operator runs a diagnostic (diagnostic), which reports back that there is no mal-
function (¬malfunction). Or, alternatively, the air-lock may not be sealed correctly
(noseal). The operator furthermore checks the temperature because he suspects
that the temperature is the problem (verifytemp), but the defective temperature
sensor returns no temperature when checked (notemp). These three technical prob-
lems require physical maintenance and the operator should send someone out to fix
them. Technical problems do not affect the brewing. As such, the brewing process
should not be interrupted for such problems as this will ruin the current batch.
If there is a production problem, however, the brewing process needs to be in-
terrupted as soon as possible (in addition, evidently, to interrupting the brewing
process when the brewing is done). This prevents the current batch from being
ruined due to over-brewing but also allows the interaction with the contents of the
kettle. In particular, when the problem is diagnosed to be low yeast the solution is
to add a new batch of yeast and restart the process. Similarly, low temperature can
be solved by raising the kettle temperature and restarting the fermentation process.
Obviously, the goal is to avoid ruining the current batch. An employer radios in
that the seal is okay. We have the following program:
lowyeast ∨ lowtemp ∨ noseal ∨malfunction ← not bubbles
diagnostic ←
¬malfunction ← diagnostic
verifytemp ←
notemp ← verifytemp
maintenance ← noseal ∨malfunction ∨ notemp
brew ← not (lowyeast ∨ lowtemp ∨ done)
addyeast ← lowyeast
raisetemp ← lowtemp
ruin ← raisetemp, not lowtemp
ruin ← addyeast , not lowyeast
ruin ← not brew , not (lowtemp ∨ lowyeast)
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← ruin
¬noseal ←
The program above does not use the standard ASP syntax since we allow for
disjunction in the body. Furthermore, the disjunction used in the head and the
body is weak disjunction. The only information that we can therefore deduce from
e.g. the first rule is (lowyeast ∨ lowtemp ∨ noseal ∨malfunction). At first, this new
form of disjunction may indeed appear weaker that strong disjunction since it does
not induce a choice. Still, even without inducing a choice, conclusions obtained
from other rules may allow us to refine our knowledge. In particular, note that
from lowyeast ∨ lowtemp ∨ noseal ∨ malfunction together with ¬malfunction and
¬noseal we can entail lowyeast ∨ lowtemp. Similarly, conclusions can also have
prerequisites that are disjunctions. For example, we can no longer deduce brew
since lowyeast ∨ lowtemp entails lowyeast ∨ lowtemp ∨ done. From maintenance ←
noseal ∨ malfunction ∨ notemp and notemp we can deduce that we should call
maintenance. However, we do not yet have enough information to diagnose whether
yeast should be added or whether the temperature should be raised. The unique
answer set of this program, according to the semantics of weak disjunction which
we present in Section 4, is given by
{lowyeast ∨ lowtemp,maintenance,
diagnostic,¬malfunction , verifytemp, notemp,¬noseal}
The expressiveness of weak disjunction becomes clear when we study its com-
plexity. In particular, we show that while most complexity results coincide with the
strong disjunctive semantics, the complexity of brave reasoning (deciding whether a
literal ‘l’ is entailed by a consistent answer set of program P ) in absence of negation-
as-failure is lower for weak disjunction. Still, the expressiveness is higher than for
normal programs. The complexity results are summarized in Table 1 in Section 5.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide the
reader with some important notions from answer set programming and possibilistic
logic. In Section 3 we introduce new semantics for PASP which can furthermore be
used to characterize normal ASP programs using possibility theory. In Section 4
we characterize disjunctive ASP in terms of constraints on possibility distributions
and we discuss the complexity results of the new semantics for PASP in detail in
Section 5. Related work is discussed in Section 6 and we formulate our conclusions
in Section 7.
This paper aggregates and extends parts of our work from (Bauters et al. 2011)
and substantially extends a previous conference paper (Bauters et al. 2010), which
did not consider classical negation nor computational complexity. In addition, rather
than limiting ourselves to atoms in this paper, we extend our work to cover the case
of literals, which offer interesting and unexpected results in the face of weak dis-
junction. Complexity results are added for all reasoning tasks and full proofs are
provided in appendix.
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2 Background
We start by reviewing the definitions from both answer set programming and pos-
sibilistic logic that will be used in the remainder of the paper. We then review the
semantics of PASP from (Nicolas et al. 2006), a framework that combines possi-
bilistic logic and ASP. Finally, we recall some notions from complexity theory.
2.1 Answer Set Programming
To define ASP programs, we start from a finite set of atoms A. A literal is defined
as an atom a or its classical negation ¬a. For L a set of literals, we use ¬L to denote
the set {¬l | l ∈ L} where, by definition, ¬¬a = a. A set of literals L is consistent if
L∩ ¬L = ∅. We write the set of all literals as L = (A∪¬A). A naf-literal is either
a literal ‘l’ or a literal ‘l’ preceded by not, which we call the negation-as-failure
operator. Intuitively, ‘not l’ is true when we cannot prove ‘l’. An expression of the
form
l0; ...; lk ← lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln
with li a literal for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n, is called a disjunctive rule. We call l0; ...; lk the
head of the rule (interpreted as a disjunction) and lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln
the body of the rule (interpreted as a conjunction). For a rule r we use head(r) and
body(r) to denote the set of literals in the head, resp. the body. Specifically, we
use body+(r) to denote the set of literals in the body that are not preceded by the
negation-as-failure operator ‘not’ and body−(r) for those literals that are preceded
by ‘not’. Whenever a disjunctive rule does not contain negation-as-failure, i.e. when
n = m, we say that it is a positive disjunctive rule. A rule with an empty body,
i.e. a rule of the form (l0; ...; lk ←), is called a fact and is used as a shorthand for
(l0; ...; lk ← ⊤) with ⊤ a special language construct that denotes tautology. A rule
with an empty head, i.e. a rule of the form (← lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln),
is called a constraint rule and is used as a shorthand for the rule of the form
(⊥ ← lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln) with ⊥ a special language construct that de-
notes contradiction.
A (positive) disjunctive program P is a set of (positive) disjunctive rules. A nor-
mal rule is a disjunctive rule with at most one literal in the head. A simple rule
is a normal rule with no negation-as-failure. A definite rule is a simple rule with
no classical negation, i.e. in which all literals are atoms. A normal ( resp. simple,
definite) program P is a set of normal (resp. simple, definite) rules.
The Herbrand base BP of a disjunctive program P is the set of atoms appearing
in P . We define the set of literals that are relevant for a disjunctive program P as
LitP = (BP ∪ ¬BP ). An interpretation I of a disjunctive program P is any set of
literals I ⊆ LitP . A consistent interpretation I is an interpretation I that does not
contain both a and ¬a for some a ∈ I.
A consistent interpretation I is said to be amodel of a positive disjunctive rule r if
head(r)∩I 6= ∅ or body(r) 6⊆ I, i.e. the body is false or the head is true. In particular,
a consistent interpretation I is a model of a constraint rule r if body(r) 6⊆ I. If for
an interpretation I and a constraint rule r we have that body(r) ⊆ I, then we say
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that the interpretation I violates the constraint rule r. Notice that for a fact rule
we require that head(r) ∩ I 6= ∅, i.e. at least one of the literals in the head must
be true. Indeed, otherwise I would not be a model of r. An interpretation I of
a positive disjunctive program P is a model of P either if I is consistent and for
every rule r ∈ P we have that I is a model of r, or if I = LitP . It follows from this
definition that LitP is always a model of P , and that all other models of P (if any)
are consistent interpretations, which we will further on also refer to as consistent
models. We say that I is an answer set of the positive disjunctive program P when I
is a minimal model of P w.r.t. set inclusion.
The semantics of an ASP program with negation-as-failure is based on the idea
of a stable model (Gelfond and Lifzchitz 1988). The reduct P I of a disjunctive
program P w.r.t. the interpretation I is defined as:
P I ={l0; . . . ; lk ← lk+1, ..., lm | ({lm+1, ..., ln} ∩ I = ∅)
∧ (l0; ...; lk ← lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln) ∈ P}.
An interpretation I is said to be an answer set of the disjunctive program P when I
is an answer set of the positive disjunctive program P I (hence the notion of stable
model). Note that we can also write the disjunctive program P as P = P ′∪C where
C is the set of constraint rules in P . An interpretation I then is an answer set of
the disjunctive program P when I is an answer set of P ′ and I is a model of C,
i.e. I does not violate any constraints in C. Whenever P has consistent answer sets,
i.e. answer sets that are consistent interpretations, we say that P is a consistent
program. When P has the answer set LitP , then this is the unique (Baral 2003)
inconsistent answer set and we say that P is an inconsistent program.
Answer sets of simple programs can also be defined in a more procedural way.
By using the immediate consequence operator TP , which is defined for a simple
program P without constraint rules and w.r.t. an interpretation I as:
TP (I) = {l0 | (l0 ← l1, ..., lm) ∈ P ∧ {l1, ..., lm} ⊆ I} .
We use P ⋆ to denote the fixpoint which is obtained by repeatedly applying TP
starting from the empty interpretation ∅, i.e. it is the least fixpoint of TP w.r.t. set
inclusion. When the interpretation P ⋆ is consistent, P ⋆ is the (unique and consis-
tent) answer set of the simple program P without constraint rules. When we allow
constraint rules, an interpretation is a (consistent) answer set of P = P ′ ∪C iff I is
a (consistent) answer set of P and I is a model of C. For both simple and normal
programs, with or without constraint rules, we have that LitP is the (unique and
inconsistent) answer set of P if P has no consistent answer set(s).
2.2 Possibilistic Logic
An interpretation in possibilistic logic corresponds with the notion of an interpreta-
tion in propositional logic. We represent such an interpretation as a set of atoms ω,
where ω |= a if a ∈ ω and ω |= ¬a otherwise with |= the satisfaction relation from
classical logic. The set of all interpretations is defined as Ω = 2A, with A a finite set
of atoms. At the semantic level, possibilistic logic (Dubois et al. 1994) is defined in
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terms of a possibility distribution pi on the universe of interpretations. A possibility
distribution, which is an Ω → [0, 1] mapping, encodes for each interpretation (or
world) ω to what extent it is plausible that ω is the actual world. By convention,
pi(ω) = 0 means that ω is impossible and pi(ω) = 1 means that no available informa-
tion prevents ω from being the actual world. A possibility distribution pi is said to be
normalized if ∃ω ∈ Ω ·pi(ω) = 1, i.e. at least one interpretation is entirely plausible.
We say that a possibility distribution pi is vacuous when ∀ω ∈ Ω · pi(ω) = 0. Note
that possibility degrees are mainly interpreted qualitatively: when pi(ω) > pi(ω′),
ω is considered more plausible than ω′. For two possibility distributions pi1 and pi2
with the same domain Ω we write pi1 ≥ pi2 when ∀ω ∈ Ω · pi1(ω) ≥ pi2(ω) and we
write pi1 > pi2 when pi1 ≥ pi2 and pi1 6= pi2.
A possibility distribution pi induces two uncertainty measures that allow us to
rank propositions. The possibility measure Π is defined by (Dubois et al. 1994):
Π(p) = max {pi(ω) | ω |= p}
and evaluates the extent to which a proposition p is consistent with the beliefs
expressed by pi. The dual necessity measure N is defined by:
N(p) = 1−Π(¬p)
and evaluates the extent to which a proposition p is entailed by the available be-
liefs (Dubois et al. 1994). Note that we always have N(⊤) = 1 for any possibility
distribution, while Π(⊤) = 1 (and, related, N(⊥) = 0) only holds when the possi-
bility distribution is normalized (i.e. only normalized possibility distributions can
express consistent beliefs) (Dubois et al. 1994). To identify the possibility/necessity
measure associated with a specific possibility distribution piX, we will use a subscript
notation, i.e. ΠX and NX are the corresponding possibility and necessity measure,
respectively. We omit the subscript when the possibility distribution is clear from
the context.
An important property of necessity measures is the min-decomposability prop-
erty w.r.t. conjunction: N(p ∧ q) = min(N(p), N(q)) for all propositions p and q.
However, for disjunction only the inequality N(p ∨ q) ≥ max(N(p), N(q)) holds.
As possibility measures are the dual measures of necessity measures, they have the
property of max-decomposability w.r.t. disjunction, whereas for the conjunction
only the inequality Π(p ∧ q) ≤ min (Π(p),Π(q)) holds.
At the syntactic level, a possibilistic knowledge base consists of pairs (p, c) where
p is a propositional formula and c ∈ ]0, 1] expresses the certainty that p is the case.
Formulas of the form (p, 0) are not explicitly represented in the knowledge base since
they encode trivial information. A formula (p, c) is interpreted as the constraint
N(p) ≥ c, i.e. a possibilistic knowledge base Σ corresponds to a set of constraints
on possibility distributions. Typically, there can be many possibility distributions
that satisfy these constraints. In practice, we are usually only interested in the
least specific possibility distribution, which is the possibility distribution that makes
minimal commitments, i.e. the greatest possibility distribution w.r.t. the ordering >
defined above. Such a least specific possibility distribution always exists and is
unique (Dubois et al. 1994).
Characterizing and Extending ASP using Possibility Theory 9
In Section 4 we will also consider constraints that deviate from the form of con-
straints we just discussed. As a result, there can be multiple minimally specific
possibility distributions rather than a unique least specific possibility distribution.
To increase the uniformity throughout the paper we immediately start using the
concept of a minimally specific possibility distribution, which is a maximal possibil-
ity distribution w.r.t. the ordering >, even though the distinction between the least
specific possibility distribution and minimally specific possibility distributions only
becomes relevant once we discuss the characterization of disjunctive programs.
2.3 Possibilistic Answer Set Programming
Possibilistic ASP (PASP) (Nicolas et al. 2006) combines ASP and possibility theory
by associating a weight with each rule, where the weight denotes the necessity with
which the head of the rule can be concluded given that the body is known to hold.
If it is uncertain whether the body holds, the necessity with which the head can be
derived is the minimum of the weight associated with the rule and the degree to
which the body is necessarily true.
Syntactically, a possibilistic disjunctive (resp. normal, simple, definite) program
is a set of pairs p = (r, λ) with r a disjunctive (resp. normal, simple, definite)
rule and λ ∈ ]0, 1] a certainty associated with r. Possibilistic rules with λ = 0
are generally omitted as only trivial information can be derived from them. We
will also write a possibilistic rule p = (r, λ) with r a disjunctive rule of the form
(l0; ...; lk ← lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln) as:
λ : l0; ...; lk ← lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln.
For a possibilistic rule p = (r, λ) we use p∗ to denote r, i.e. the classical rule ob-
tained by ignoring the certainty. Similarly, for a possibilistic program P we use
P ∗ to denote the set of rules {p∗ | p ∈ P}. The set of all weights found in a possi-
bilistic program P is denoted by cert(P ) = {λ | p = (r, λ) ∈ P}. We will also use
the extended set of weights cert+(P ), defined as cert+(P ) = {λ | λ ∈ cert(P )} ∪
{1− λ | λ ∈ cert(P )} ∪
{
0, 12 , 1
}
.
Semantically, PASP is based on a generalization of the concept of an interpreta-
tion. In classical ASP, an interpretation can be seen as a mapping I : LitP → {0, 1},
i.e. a literal l ∈ LitP is either true or false. This notion is generalized in PASP
to a valuation, which is a function V : LitP → [0, 1]. The underlying intuition of
V (l) = λ is that the literal ‘l’ is true with certainty ‘λ’, which we will also write
in set notation as lλ ∈ V . As such, a valuation corresponds with the set of con-
straints
{
N(l) ≥ λ | lλ ∈ V
}
. Note that, like interpretations in ASP, these valua-
tions are of an epistemic nature, i.e. they reflect what we know about the truth of
atoms. For notational convenience, we often also use the set notation V =
{
lλ, . . .
}
.
In accordance with this set notation, we write V = ∅ to denote the valuation in
which each literal is mapped to 0. For λ ∈ [0, 1] a certainty and V a valuation,
we use V λ to denote the classical projection {l | l ∈ LitP , V (l) ≥ λ}. We also use
V λ = {l | l ∈ LitP , V (l) > λ}, i.e. those literals that can be derived to be true with
certainty strictly greater than ‘λ’. A valuation is said to be consistent when V 0 is
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consistent. In such a case, there always exists a normalized possibility distribution
piV such that NV (l) = V (l).
We now present a straightforward extension of the semantics for PASP introduced
in (Nicolas et al. 2006). Let the λ-cut Pλ of a possibilistic program P , with λ ∈
[0, 1], be defined as:
Pλ = {r | (r, λ
′) ∈ P and λ′ ≥ λ} ,
i.e. the rules in P with an associated certainty higher than or equal to ‘λ’.
Definition 1
Let P be a possibilistic simple program and V a valuation. The immediate conse-
quence operator TP is defined as:
TP (V )(l0) = max
{
λ ∈ [0, 1] | V λ |= l1, ..., lm and (l0 ← l1, ..., lm) ∈ Pλ
}
.
The intuition of Definition 1 is that we can derive the head only with the certainty
of the weakest piece of information, i.e. the necessity of the conclusion is restricted
either by the certainty of the rule itself or the lowest certainty of the literals used
in the body of the rule. Note that the immediate consequence operator defined
in Definition 1 is equivalent to the one proposed in (Nicolas et al. 2006), although
we formulate it somewhat differently. Also, the work from (Nicolas et al. 2006) only
considered definite programs, even though adding classical negation does not impose
any problems.
As before, we use P ⋆ to denote the fixpoint obtained by repeatedly applying TP
starting from the minimal valuation V = ∅, i.e. the least fixpoint of TP w.r.t. set
inclusion. A valuation V is said to be the answer set of a possibilistic simple program
if V = P ⋆ and V is consistent. Answer sets of possibilistic normal programs are
defined using a reduct. Let L be a set of literals. The reduct PL of a possibilistic
normal program is defined as (Nicolas et al. 2006):
PL = {(head(r)← body+(r), λ) | (r, λ) ∈ P and body−(r) ∩ L = ∅} .
A consistent valuation V is said to be a possibilistic answer set of the possibilistic
normal program P iff
(
P (V
0)
)⋆
= V , i.e. if V is the answer set of the reduct P (V
0).
Example 1
Consider the possibilistic normal program P from the introduction:
0.1: invalid ←
1: airport ← not invalid
It is easy to verify that
{
invalid0 .1
}
is a possibilistic answer set of P . Indeed,
P {invalid} is the set of rules:
0.1: invalid ←
from which it trivially follows that (P {invalid})
⋆
=
{
invalid 0 .1
}
. The conclusion is
thus that we do not need to go to the airport, which differs from our intuition of
the problem. We will revisit this example in Example 4 in Section 3.2.
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The semantics we presented allow for classical negation, even though this was
not considered in (Nicolas et al. 2006). However, adding classical negation does
not impose any problems and could, as an alternative, easily be simulated in
ASP (Baral 2003).
2.4 Complexity Theory
Finally, we recall some notions from complexity theory. The complexity classes ΣP2
and ΠP2 are defined as follows (Papadimitriou 1994):
ΣP0 = Π
P
0 = P
ΣP1 = NP Σ
P
2 = NP
NP
ΠP1 = coNP Π
P
2 = coΣ
P
2
where NPNP is the class of problems that can be solved in polynomial time on
a non-deterministic machine with an NP oracle, i.e. assuming a procedure that
can solve NP problems in constant time. We also consider the complexity class
BH2 (Cai et al. 1988), which is the class of all languages L such that L = L1 ∩ L2,
where L1 is in NP and L2 is in coNP. For a general complexity class C, a problem is
C-hard if any problem in C can be polynomially reduced to this problem. A problem
is said to be C-complete if the problem is in C and the problem is C-hard. Deciding
the validity of a Quantified Boolean Formula (QBF) φ = ∃X1∀X2 · p(X1, X2) with
p(X1, X2) in disjunctive normal form (DNF) is the canonical Σ
P
2 -complete problem.
The decision problems we consider in this paper are brave reasoning (deciding
whether a literal ‘l’ (clause ‘e’) is entailed by a consistent answer set of program
P ), cautious reasoning (deciding whether a literal ‘l’ (clause ‘e’) is entailed by
every consistent answer set of a program P ) and answer set existence (deciding
whether a program P has a consistent answer set). Brave reasoning as well as
answer set existence for simple, normal and disjunctive programs is P-complete,
NP-complete and ΣP2 -complete, respectively (Baral 2003). Cautious reasoning for
simple, normal and disjunctive programs is P-complete, coNP-complete and ΠP2 -
complete (Baral 2003).
3 Characterizing (P)ASP
ASP lends itself well to being characterized in terms of modalities. For instance,
ASP can be characterized in autoepistemic logic by interpreting ‘not a’ as the
epistemic formula ¬La (“a is not believed”) (Gelfond 1987). In this paper, as an
alternative, we show how ASP can be characterized within possibility theory. To
arrive at this characterization, we first note that ASP is essentially a special case
of PASP in which every rule is certain. As such, we will show how PASP can
be characterized within possibility theory. This characterization does not coincide
with the semantics proposed in (Nicolas et al. 2006) for PASP, as the semantics
from (Nicolas et al. 2006) rely on the classical Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct. Rather,
the semantics that we propose for PASP adhere to a different intuition of negation-
12 Kim Bauters et al.
as-failure. A characterization of ASP is then obtained from these new semantics by
considering the special case in which all rules are entirely certain.
This characterization of ASP, while still in terms of modalities, stays close in
spirit to the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct. In contrast to the characterization in terms
of autoepistemic logic it does not require a special translation of literals to deal with
classical negation and disjunction. The core idea of our characterization is to encode
the meaning of each rule as a constraint on possibility distributions. Particular
minimally specific possibility distributions that satisfy all the constraints imposed
by the rules of a program will then correspond to the answer sets of that program.
In this section, we first limit our scope to possibilistic simple programs (Section 3.1).
Afterwards we will broaden the scope and also consider possibilistic normal pro-
grams (Section 3.2). The most general case, in which we also consider possibilistic
disjunctive programs, will be discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Characterizing Possibilistic Simple Programs
When considering a fact, i.e. a rule of the form r = (l0 ← ⊤), we know by definition
that this rule encodes that the literal in the head is necessarily true, i.e. N(l0) = 1.
If we attach a weight to a fact, then this expresses the knowledge that we are not
entirely certain of the conclusion in the head, i.e. for a possibilistic rule p = (r, λ)
we have that N(l0) ≥ N(⊤). Note that the constraint uses ≥, as there may be other
rules in the program that allow us to deduce l0 with a greater certainty.
In a similar fashion we can characterize a rule of the form (l0 ← l1, ..., lm)
as the constraint N(l0) ≥ N(l1 ∧ ... ∧ lm) which is equivalent to the constraint
N(l0) ≥ min(N(l1), ..., N(lm)) due to the min-decomposability property of the
necessity measure. Indeed, the intuition of such a rule is that the head is only
necessarily true when every part of the body is true. When associating a weight
with a rule, we obtain the constraint N(l0) ≥ min(N(l1), ..., N(lm), λ) for a possi-
bilistic rule p = (r, λ) with r = (l0 ← l1, ..., lm). Similarly, to characterize a con-
straint rule, i.e. a rule of the form r = (⊥ ← l1, ..., lm), we use the constraint
N(⊥) ≥ min(N(l1), ..., N(lm)), or, in the possibilistic case with p = (r, λ), the
constraint N(⊥) ≥ min(N(l1), ..., N(lm), λ).
Definition 2
Let P be a possibilistic simple program and pi : Ω → [0, 1] a possibility distribu-
tion. For every p ∈ P , the constraint γ(p) imposed by p = (r, λ) with λ ∈ ]0, 1],
r = (l0 ← l1, ..., lm) and m ≥ 0 is given by
N(l0) ≥ min(N(l1), ..., N(lm), λ). (1)
CP = {γ(p) | p ∈ P} is the set of constraints imposed by program P . If pi satisfies
the constraints in CP , pi is said to be a possibilistic model of CP , written pi |= CP .
A possibilistic model of CP will also be called a possibilistic model of P . We write
SP for the set of all minimally specific possibilistic models of P .
Definition 3
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Let P be a possibilistic simple program. Let pi be a minimally specific model of P ,
i.e. pi ∈ SP . Then V =
{
lN (l) | l ∈ LitP
}
is called a possibilistic answer set of P .
Example 2
Consider the possibilistic simple program P with the rules:
0.8 :a← 0.6 :¬b← a
0.7 : c← a,¬b 0.9 : d← d.
The set CP consists of the constraints:
N(a) ≥ 0.8 N(¬b) ≥ min(N(a), 0.6)
N(c) ≥ min(N(a), N(¬b), 0.7) N(d) ≥ min(N(d), 0.9).
It is easy to see that the last constraint is trivial and can be omitted and that the
other constraints can be simplified to Π(¬a) ≤ 0.2, Π(b) ≤ 0.4 and Π(¬c) ≤ 0.4.
The least specific possibility distribution that satisfies these constraints is given by:
pi({a, b, c, d}) = 0.4 pi({a, c, d}) = 1 pi({b, c, d}) = 0.2 pi({c, d}) = 0.2
pi({a, b, c}) = 0.4 pi({a, c}) = 1 pi({b, c}) = 0.2 pi({c}) = 0.2
pi({a, b, d}) = 0.4 pi({a, d}) = 0.4 pi({b, d}) = 0.2 pi({d}) = 0.2
pi({a, b}) = 0.4 pi({a}) = 0.4 pi({b}) = 0.2 pi({}) = 0.2.
By definition, since the possibility distribution pi satisfies the given constraints,
is a possibilistic model. Furthermore, it is easy to see that pi is the unique min-
imally specific possibilistic model (due to least specificity). We can verify that
N(¬a) = N(b) = N(¬c) = N(¬d) = 0 since we have that pi({a, c, d}) = 1 and that
N(d) = 0 since pi({a, c}) = 1. Furthermore it is easy to verify that N(a) = 0.8,
N(¬b) = 0.6 and N(c) = 0.6. Hence we find that V =
{
a0 .8 ,¬b0 .6 , c0 .6
}
is a
possibilistic answer set of P .
In particular, when we consider all the rules to be entirely certain, i.e. λ = 1, the
results are compatible with the semantics of classical ASP.
Example 3
Consider the program P = {(b← a), (¬a←)}. The set of constraints CP is given
by N(b) ≥ N(a) and N(¬a) ≥ N(⊤). The first constraint can be rewritten as
1−Π(¬b) ≥ 1−Π(¬a), i.e. as Π(¬a) ≥ Π(¬b). The last constraint can be rewritten
as 1−Π(a) ≥ 1, i.e. as Π(a) = max {pi(ω) | ω |= a} = 0. Given these two constraints,
we find that SP contains exactly one element, which is defined by
pi({a, b}) = 0 pi({a}) = 0
pi({b}) = 1 pi({}) = 1.
Notice how the first constraint turned out to be of no relevance for this particular
example. Indeed, due to the principle of minimal specificity and since there is noth-
ing that prevents Π(¬a) = 1, we find that N(a) = 1 − Π(¬a) = 0. Therefore the
first constraint simplifies to N(b) ≥ 0. Once more, due to the principle of minimal
specificity we thus find that N(b) = 0 as there is no information that prevents
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Π(¬b) = 1. To find out whether a, b, ¬a and ¬b are necessarily true w.r.t. the least
specific possibility distribution pi ∈ SP arising from the program, we verify whether
N(a) = 1, N(b) = 1, N(¬a) = 1 and N(¬b) = 1, respectively, with N the necessity
measure induced by the unique least specific possibility distribution pi ∈ SP . As de-
sired, we find that N(¬a) = 1−Π(a) = 1 whereas N(a) = N(b) = N(¬b) = 0. The
unique possibilistic answer set is therefore
{
¬a1
}
. As we will see, it then follows
from Proposition 1 that the unique classical answer set of P is {¬a}.
In Propositions 1 and 2, below, we prove that this is indeed a correct characteriza-
tion of simple programs. First, we present a technical lemma.
Lemma 1
Let L be a set of literals, M ⊆ L a consistent set of literals and let the possibility
distribution pi be defined as pi(ω) = 1 if ω |= M and pi(ω) = 0 otherwise. Then
M = {l | N(l) = 1, l ∈ L}.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 1–2.
Proposition 1
Let P be a simple program. If pi ∈ SP then either the unique consistent answer set
of P is given by M = {l | N(l) = 1, l ∈ LitP } or pi is the vacuous distribution, in
which case P does not have any consistent answer sets.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 2–4.
Proposition 2
Let P be a simple program. If M is an answer set of P then the possibility distri-
bution pi defined by pi(ω) = 1 iff ω |=M and pi(ω) = 0 otherwise belongs to SP .
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 4.
3.2 Characterizing Possibilistic Normal Programs
To deal with negation-as-failure, we rely on a reduct-style approach in which a
valuation is guessed and it is verified whether this guess is indeed stable. The
approach taken in (Gelfond and Lifzchitz 1988) to deal with negation-as-failure is
to guess an interpretation and verify whether this guess is stable. We propose to
treat a rule of the form r = (l0 ← l1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln) as the constraint
N(l0) ≥ min (N(l1), ..., N(lm), 1− V (lm+1), ..., 1− V (ln))
where V is the guess for the valuation and where we assume min({}) = 1. Or, when
we consider a possibilistic rule p = (r, λ), we treat it as the constraint
N(l0) ≥ min (N(l1), ..., N(lm), 1− V (lm+1), ..., 1− V (ln), λ) .
We like to make it clear to the reader that the characterization of normal pro-
grams in terms of constraints on possibility distributions in its basic form is little
more than a reformulation of the Gelfond-Lifschitz approach. The key difference
is that this characterization can be used to guess the certainty with which we can
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derive particular literals from the available rules, rather than guessing what may or
may not be derived from it. Nevertheless, this difference plays a crucial role when
dealing with uncertain rules. In particular, this characterization of PASP does not
coincide with the semantics of (Nicolas et al. 2006) and adheres to a different intu-
ition for negation-as-failure.
Definition 4
Let P be a possibilistic normal program and let V be a valuation. For every
p ∈ P , the constraint γ
V
(p) induced by p = (r, λ) with λ ∈ ]0, 1], r = (l0 ←
l1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln) and V is given by
N(l0) ≥ min (N(l1), ..., N(lm), 1− V (lm+1), ..., 1− V (ln), λ) . (2)
C(P,V ) = {γV (p) | p ∈ P} is the set of constraints imposed by program P and
valuation V , and S(P,V ) is the set of all minimally specific possibilistic models of
C(P,V ).
Definition 5
Let P be a possibilistic normal program and let V be a valuation. Let pi ∈ S(P,V )
be such that
∀l ∈ LitP ·N(l) = V (l)
then V =
{
lN (l) | l ∈ LitP
}
is called a possibilistic answer set of P .
Example 4
Consider the possibilistic normal program P from Example 1. The constraints CP
induced by P are:
N(invalid) ≥ 0.1
N(airport) ≥ min(1− V (invalid ), 1)
From the first constraint it readily follows that we need to choose V (invalid) = 0.1
to comply with the principle of minimal specificity. The other constraint can then
readily be simplified to:
N(airport) ≥ 0.9
Hence it follows that V =
{
invalid0 .1 , airport0 .9
}
is the unique possibilistic answer
set of P .
It is easy to see that the proposed semantics remain closer to the intuition of
the possibilistic normal program discussed in the introduction. Indeed, we conclude
with a high certainty that we need to go to the airport.
Still, it is interesting to further investigate the particular relationship between
the semantics for PASP as proposed in (Nicolas et al. 2006) and the semantics
presented in this section. Let the possibilistic rule r be of the form:
λ : l0; ...; lk ← lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln.
When we determine the reduct w.r.t. a valuation V of the possibilistic program
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containing r, then the certainty of the rule in the reduct that corresponds with r
can be verified to be:
min(FN (V (lm+1)), ..., FN (V (ln)), λ)
with FN a fuzzy negator, i.e. where FN is a decreasing function with FN (0) = 1
and FN (1) = 0. In particular, for the semantics of (Nicolas et al. 2006) we have that
FN is the Go¨del negator FG, defined as FG(0) = 1 and FG(c) = 0 with 0 < c ≤ 1.
In the semantics for PASP presented in this section, FN is the  Lukasiewicz negator
F L(c) = 1− c with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. Thus, for a rule such as:
0.9: b ← not a
and a valuation V =
{
a0 .2
}
we obtain under the approach from (Nicolas et al. 2006)
the reduct (0: b ← ), whereas under our approach we obtain the constraint N(b) ≥
min(0.9, 1 − 0.2), which can be encoded by the rule (0.8: b ← ). Essentially, the
difference between both semantics can thus be reduced to a difference in the choice
of negator. However, even though the semantics share similarities, there is a no-
table difference in the underlying intuition of both approaches. Specifically, in the
semantics presented in this paper, we have that ‘not l’ is understood as “the degree
to which ‘¬l’ is possible”, or, equivalently, “the degree to which it is not the case
that we can derive ‘l’ with certainty”. This contrasts with the intuition of ‘not l’
in (Nicolas et al. 2006) as a Boolean condition and understood as “we cannot derive
‘l’ with a strictly positive certainty”.
Interestingly, we find that the complexity of the main reasoning tasks for possi-
bilistic normal programs remains at the same level of the polynomial hierarchy as
the corresponding normal ASP programs.
While we will see in Section 5 that the complexity of possibilistic normal pro-
grams remains unchanged compared to classical normal programs, it is important
to note that under the semantics proposed in this section there is no longer a 1-on-1
mapping between the classical answer sets of a normal program and the possibilis-
tic answer sets. Indeed, if we consider a possibilistic normal program constructed
from a classical normal program where we attach certainty λ = 1 to each rule, then
we can sometimes obtain additional intermediary answer sets. Consider the next
example:
Example 5
Consider the normal program with the single rule a ← not a. This program has
no classical answer sets. Now consider the possibilistic normal program P with the
rule
1: a ← not a.
The set of constraints C(P,V ) is given by
N(a) ≥ min(1 − V (a), 1).
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This constraint can be rewritten as
N(a) ≥ min(1− V (a), 1)
≡ N(a) ≥ 1− V (a)
≡ 1−Π(¬a) ≥ 1− V (a)
≡ Π(¬a) ≤ V (a).
We thus find that the set S(P,V ) is a singleton with pi ∈ S(P,V ) defined by pi({a}) = 1
and pi({}) = V (a). We can now establish for which choices of V (a) it holds that
V (a) = N(a):
V (a) = N(a)
Π(¬a) = 1−Π(¬a)
2 · Π(¬a) = 1
and thus, since Π(¬a) ≤ V (a), we have pi({}) = 0.5. The unique possibilistic answer
set of P is therefore
{
a0 .5
}
. In the same way, one may verify that the program
1: a ← not b 1: b ← not a
has an infinite number of possibilistic answer sets, i.e.
{
ac, b1−c
}
for every c ∈ [0, 1].
For practical purposes, however, this behavior has a limited impact as we only need
to consider a finite number of certainty levels to perform brave/cautious reasoning.
Indeed, we only need to consider the certainties used in the program, their com-
plement to account for negation-as-failure and 12 to account for the intermediary
value as in Example 5. Thus, for the main reasoning tasks it suffices to limit our
attention to the certainties from the set cert+(P ).
We now show that when we consider rules with an absolute certainty, i.e. classical
normal programs, we obtain a correct characterization of classical ASP, provided
that we restrict ourselves to absolutely certain conclusions, i.e. valuations V for
which it holds that ∀l · V (l) ∈ {0, 1}.
Example 6
Consider the program P with the rules
a← b← b c← a, not b.
The set of constraints C(P,V ) is then given by
N(a) ≥ 1 N(b) ≥ N(b) N(c) ≥ min (N(a), 1 − V (b)) .
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We can rewrite the first constraint as 1−Π(¬a) ≥ 1 and thus Π(¬a) = 0. The second
constraint is trivially satisfied and, since it does not entail any new information, can
be dropped. The last constraint can be rewritten as Π(¬c) ≤ 1−min(1−Π(¬a), 1−
V (b)), which imposes an upper bound on the value that Π(¬c) can assume. Since
we already know that Π(¬a) = 0 we can further simplify this inequality to Π(¬c) ≤
1−min(1−0, 1−V (b)) = 1−(1−V (b)) = V (b). In conclusion, the program imposes
the constraints
Π(¬a) = 0 Π(¬c) ≤ V (b).
The set S(P,V ) then contains exactly one element, which is defined by
pi({a, b, c}) = 1 pi({b, c}) = 0
pi({a, b}) = V (b) pi({b}) = 0
pi({a, c}) = 1 pi({c}) = 0
pi({a}) = V (b) pi({}) = 0.
Note that this possibility distribution is independent of the choice for V (a) and
V (c) since there are no occurrences of ‘not a’ and ‘not c’ in P . It remains then to
determine for which choices of V (b) it holds that V (b) = N(b), i.e. for which the
guess V (b) is stable. We have:
V (b) = N(b) = 1−Π(¬b) = 1−max {pi(ω) | ω |= ¬b} = 0
and thus we find that pi({a, b}) = pi({a}) = 0. We have N(a) = 1 − Π(¬a) = 1,
N(c) = 1 − Π(¬c) = 1 and N(b) = 1 − Π(¬b) = 0. As we will see in the next
propositions, the unique answer set of P is therefore {a, c}.
Proposition 3
Let P be a normal program and V a valuation. Let pi ∈ S(P,V ) be such that
∀l ∈ LitP · V (l) = N(l) ; and (3)
∀l ∈ LitP ·N(l) ∈ {0, 1} (4)
then M = {l | N(l) = 1, l ∈ LitP} is an answer set of the normal program P .
Proof
This proposition is a special case of Proposition 5 presented below.
Note that the requirement stated in (4) cannot be omitted. Let us consider Exam-
ple 5, in which we considered the normal program P = {a← not a}. This normal
program P has no classical answer sets. The constraint that corresponds with the
rule (a ← not a) is N(a) ≥ 1 − V (a). For a choice of V =
{
a0.5
}
, however, we
would find that V (a) = N(a) and thus that V is an answer set of P if we were to
omit this requirement.
Proposition 4
Let P be a normal program. If M is an answer set of P , there is a valuation V ,
defined by V (l) = 1 if l ∈M and V (l) = 0 otherwise, and a possibility distribution
pi ∈ S(P,V ) such that for every l ∈ LitP we have V (l) = N(l) (i.e. N(l) = 1 if l ∈M
and N(l
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Proof
This proposition is a special case of Proposition 6 presented below.
We like to point out to the reader that we could try to encode the information in
a rule in such a way that we interpret ‘not a’ as Π(¬a), which closely corresponds to
the intuition of negation-as-failure. Indeed, when it is completely possible to assume
that ‘¬a’ is true, then surely ‘not a’ is true. Under this encoding, however, we run
into a significant problem. Consider the rules (b ← not c) and (c ← not b). These
rules would then correspond with the constraints N(b) ≥ Π(¬c) and N(c) ≥ Π(¬b),
respectively. Notice though that both constraints can be rewritten as the constraint
1 − Π(¬b) ≥ Π(¬c). This would imply that both rules are semantically equivalent
in ASP, which is clearly not the case. Hence we cannot directly encode ‘not a’ as
Π(¬a) and guessing a valuation is indeed necessary since without the guess V we
would not be able to obtain a unique set of constraints. As we have shown this only
affects literals preceded by negation-as-failure and we can continue to interpret a
literal ‘b’ as N(b).
4 Possibilistic Semantics of Disjunctive ASP Programs
We now turn our attention to how we can characterize disjunctive rules. We found
in Section 3 that we can characterize a rule of the form r = (head ← body) as
the constraint N(head) ≥ N(body), or, similarly, that we can characterize a pos-
sibilistic rule p = (r, λ) as the constraint N(head) ≥ min(N(body), λ). Such a
characterization works particularly well due the min-decomposability w.r.t. con-
junction. Indeed, since the body of e.g. a simple rule r = (l0 ← l1, ..., lm) is
a conjunction of literals we can write body = l1 ∧ ... ∧ lm. Then N(body) can be
rewritten as min(N(l1), ..., N(lm)), which allows for a straightforward simplifica-
tion. In a similar fashion, for a positive disjunctive rule r = (l0; ...; lk ← lk+1, ..., lm)
we can readily write N(body) as min(N(lk+1), ..., N(lm)). We would furthermore
like to simplify N(head) with head = l0 ∨ ... ∨ lk. However, we do not have that
N(head) = max(N(l0), ..., N(lk)). Indeed, in general we only have that N(head) ≥
max(N(l0), ..., N(lk)). This means that we can either choose to interpret the head
as max(N(l0), ..., N(lk)) or N(l0 ∨ ... ∨ lk). In particular, a possibilistic disjunctive
rule p = (r, λ) with
r = (l0; ...; lk ← lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln)
can either be interpreted as the constraint
max(N(l0), ..., N(lk)) ≥ min(N(lk+1), ..., N(lm), 1− V (lm+1), ..., 1− V (ln), λ)
(5)
which we will call the strong interpretation of disjunction, or as the constraint
N(l0 ∨ ... ∨ lk) ≥ min(N(lk+1), ..., N(lm), 1− V (lm+1), ..., 1− V (ln), λ) (6)
which we will call the weak interpretation of disjunction. In the remainder of this
paper, we syntactically differentiate between both approaches by using the nota-
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tion l0; ...; lk and l0 ∨ ... ∨ lk to denote the strong and the weak interpretation of
disjunction, respectively.
The choice of how to treat disjunction is an important one that crucially impacts
the nature of the resulting answer sets. For example, the non-deterministic nature
of strong disjunction provides a useful way to generate different (candidate) solu-
tions, whereas weak disjunction is oftentimes better suited when we are interested
in modelling the epistemic state of an agent since it amounts to accepting the dis-
junction as being true rather than making a choice of which disjunct to accept. In
this section we consider both characterizations; the characterization of disjunction
as (5) is discussed in Section 4.1 and in Section 4.2 we discuss the characteriza-
tion as (6). In particular we will show that the first characterization of disjunction
corresponds to the semantics of disjunction found in ASP whereas the Boolean
counterpart of the second characterization has, to the best of our knowledge, not
yet been studied in the literature.
4.1 Strong Possibilistic Semantics of Disjunctive Rules
We first consider the characterization of disjunction in which we treat a disjunction
of the form ‘l0; ...; lk’ as max(N(l0), . . . , N(lk)). As it turns out, under these strong
possibilistic semantics the disjunction behaves as in classical ASP.
Definition 6
Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive program and let V be a valuation. For ev-
ery possibilistic disjunctive rule p = (r, λ) with λ ∈ ]0, 1] and r = (l0; ...; lk ←
lk+1, ..., lm, not lm+1, ..., not ln) the constraint γ
s
V
(p) induced by p and V is given
by
max(N(l0), ..., N(lk)) ≥ min(N(lk+1), ..., N(lm), 1−V (lm+1), ..., 1−V (ln), λ) (7)
Cs(P,V ) =
{
γs
V
(p) | p ∈ P
}
is the set of constraints imposed by program P and V ,
and Ss(P,V ) is the set of all minimally specific possibilistic models of C
s
(P,V ).
1
Whenever P is a positive disjunctive program, i.e. whenever P is a disjunctive
program without negation-as-failure, (7) is independent of V and we simplify the
notation to γs, CsP and S
s
P .
Notice that, unlike in possibilistic logic where a unique least specific possibility
distribution exists because of the specific form of the considered constraints, the
constraint of the form (7) can give rise to multiple minimally specific possibility
distributions of which some will correspond with answer sets. Indeed, the program
P = {a; b←} induces the constraint max(N(a), N(b)) ≥ 1, which has two minimally
specific possibility distributions, yet no least specific possibility distribution. Indeed,
we have the minimally specific possibility distributions pi1, pi2 defined by
pi1({a, b}) = 1 pi1({b}) = 0 pi2({a, b}) = 1 pi2({b}) = 1
pi1({a}) = 1 pi1({}) = 0 pi2({a}) = 0 pi2({}) = 0
1 We use the superscript ‘s’ to highlight that we employ the semantics of strong disjunction.
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Definition 7
Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive program and let V be a valuation. Let pi ∈ Ss(P,V )
be such that
∀l ∈ LitP ·N(l) = V (l)
then V =
{
lN (l) | l ∈ LitP
}
is called a possibilistic answer set of P .
We now further illustrate the semantics and the underlying intuition by consid-
ering a possibilistic disjunctive program in detail.
Example 7
Consider the possibilistic (positive) disjunctive program P with the following rules:
0.8: a; b ←
0.6: c ← a
0.4: c ← b.
The constraints CsP induced by this program are:
max(N(a), N(b)) ≥ 0.8
N(c) ≥ min(N(a), 0.6)
N(c) ≥ min(N(b), 0.4).
From the first constraint it follows that we either need to choose V (a) = 0.8 or
V (b) = 0.8, in accordance with the principal of minimal specificity. Hence, we either
obtain V (c) = 0.6 or V (c) = 0.4. As such we find that the two unique possibilistic
answer sets of P are
{
a0 .8 , c0 .6
}
and
{
b0 .8 , c0 .4
}
.
As before, if we restrict ourselves to rules that are entirely certain we obtain a
characterization of disjunctive programs in classical ASP.
Example 8
Consider the program P with the rules
a; b← a← b
The set of constraints CsP is given by
max(N(a), N(b)) ≥ N(⊤) = 1 N(a) ≥ N(b).
Intuitively, the first constraint induces a choice. To satisfy this constraint, we need
to take either N(a) = 1 or N(b) = 1. Depending on our choice, we can consider
two possibility distributions. The possibility distribution pi1 is the least specific
possibility distribution that satisfies the constraints N(a) = 1 and N(a) ≥ N(b),
whereas pi2 is the least specific possibility distribution satisfying the constraints
N(b) = 1 and N(a) ≥ N(b):
pi1({a, b}) = 1 pi1({b}) = 0
pi1({a}) = 1 pi1({}) = 0
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and
pi2({a, b}) = 1 pi2({b}) = 0
pi2({a}) = 0 pi2({}) = 0.
It is clear that the possibility distribution pi2 cannot be minimally specific w.r.t. the
constraints max(N(a), N(b)) = 1 and N(a) ≥ N(b) since pi1({a}) > pi2({a}) and
pi1(ω) ≥ pi2(ω) for all other interpretations ω. We thus have that S
s
P only contains a
single element, namely pi1. With N the necessity measure induced by pi1 we obtain
N(a) = 1 and N(b) = 0. As will follow from Proposition 5 and 6 the unique answer
set of P is therefore {a}.
Let us now add the rule (b← not b) to P . Notice that in classical ASP this extended
program has no answer sets. The set of constraints Cs(P,V ) is given by:
CsP ∪ {N(b) ≥ 1− V (b)} .
This new constraint, intuitively, tells us that ‘b’ must necessarily be true, since we
force it to be true whenever it is not true. Note, however, that the act of making
‘b’ true effectively removes the motivation for making it true in the first place.
As expected, we cannot find any minimally specific possibilistic model that agrees
with the constraints imposed by P and V such that ∀l ∈ LitP · N(l) ∈ {0, 1}.
The problem has to do with our choice of V (b). If we take V (b) = 1 then the
constraint imposed by the first rule still forces us to choose either N(a) = 1 or
N(b) = N(a) = 1 due to the interplay with the constraint imposed by the second
rule. However, Ss(P,V ) contains only one minimally specific possibility distribution,
namely the one with N(a) = 1. Hence N(b) = 0 6= V (b). If we take V (b) = 0 then
the last rule forces N(b) = 1. Hence V (b) = 0 6= 1 = N(b).
Now that we have clarified the intuition, we can formalize the connection between
the strong possibilistic semantics and classical disjunctive ASP.
Proposition 5
Let P be a disjunctive program, V a valuation and let pi ∈ Ss(P,V ) be such that
∀l ∈ LitP · V (l) = N(l) ; and (8)
∀l ∈ LitP ·N(l) ∈ {0, 1} (9)
then M = {l | N(l) = 1, l ∈ LitP} is an answer set of the disjunctive program P .
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 4–5.
Proposition 6
Let P be a disjunctive program. If M is an answer set of P , there is a valuation V ,
defined as V (l) = 1 if l ∈M and V (l) = 0 otherwise, and a possibility distribution pi,
defined as pi(ω) = 1 if ω |= M and pi(ω) = 0 otherwise, such that pi ∈ Ss(P,V ) and
for every l ∈ LitP we have V (l) = N(l).
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 5–6.
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4.2 Weak Possibilistic Semantics of Disjunctive Rules
Under the strong possibilistic semantics of disjunction we consider all the disjuncts
of a satisfied rule separately. Under this non-deterministic view the rule (a; b ←)
means that ‘a’ is believed to be true or ‘b’ is believed to be true. When looking at
answer sets as epistemic states it becomes apparent that there is also another choice
in how we can treat disjunction in the head. Indeed, we can look at the disjunction
as a whole to hold, without making any explicit choices as to which of the disjuncts
holds. When trying to reason about one’s knowledge there are indeed situations in
which we do not want, or simply cannot make, a choice as to which of the disjuncts
is true. This implies that we need to look at an answer set as a set of clauses, rather
than a set of literals.
An elaborate example using weak disjunction and uncertainty has been given in
Section 1. In this subsection we consider the semantics of such programs. For starters,
we will extend the PASP semantics with the notion of clauses, rather than literals,
and define an applicable immediate consequence operator for programs composed
of clauses. We then prove some important properties, such as the monotonicity
of the immediate consequence operator. For the classical case (i.e. when omitting
weights), we furthermore characterize the complexity of clausal programs, both
with and without negation-as-failure in Section 5. In particular, we show how the
complexity is critically determined by whether we restrict ourselves to atoms and
highlight, as shown by the higher complexity of some of the reasoning tasks, that
weak disjunction is a non-trivial extension of ASP.
We start by formally defining possibilistic clausal programs, i.e. possibilistic pro-
grams with a syntax that allows for disjunction in the body. We then define the
weak possibilistic semantics of such clausal programs in terms of constraints on
possibility distributions. We also introduce an equivalent characterization based on
an immediate consequence operator and a reduct, which is more in line with the
usual treatment of ASP programs. When all the rules are entirely certain we obtain
the classical counterpart, which we name clausal programs.
4.2.1 Semantical Characterization
We rely on the notion of a clause, i.e. a finite disjunction of literals. Consistency
and entailment for sets of clauses are defined as in propositional logic. As such, we
can derive from the information ‘a ∨ b ∨ c’ and ‘¬b’ that ‘a ∨ c’ is true.
Definition 8
A clausal rule is an expression of the form (e0 ← e1, ..., em, not em+1, ..., not en)
with ei a clause for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n. A positive clausal rule is an expression of the
form (e0 ← e1, ..., em) , i.e. a clausal rule without negation-as-failure. A (positive)
clausal program is a finite set of (positive) clausal rules.
For a clausal rule, which is of the form r = (e0 ← e1, ..., em, not em+1, ..., not en),
we say that e0 is the head and that e1, ..., em, not em+1, ..., not en is the body of
the clausal rule. We use the notation head(r) and body(r) to denote the clause in
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the head, resp. the set of clauses in the body. The Herbrand base BP of a clausal
program P is still defined as the set of atoms appearing in P . As such, possibility
distributions are defined in the usual way as pi : 2BP → [0, 1] mappings.
Until now, we were able to define the possibility distributions that satisfied the
constraints imposed by the rules in a program in terms of a valuation V , i.e. a
V : LitP → [0, 1] mapping. This need no longer be the case. Specifically, note that
we will now impose constraints of the form N(l0 ∨ ... ∨ lk) ≥ λ. Assume that we
have a possibility distribution pi defined as
pi({a, b, c}) = 0 pi({a, b}) = 0 pi({a, c}) = 1 pi({a}) = 1
pi({b, c}) = 0 pi({b}) = 0 pi({c}) = 1 pi({}) = 0.
This possibility distribution is the least specific possibility distribution that satisfies
the constraints N(a∨b∨c) = 1 and N(¬b) = 1. However, it can be verified that this
possibility distribution cannot be defined in terms of a mapping V : LitP → [0, 1].
Instead, we define the set of clauses appearing in the head of the rules of a clausal
program P as ClauseP = {head(r) | r ∈ P}. Given a clausal program, it is clear that
the only information that can be derived from the program are those clauses that
are in the head of a rule. To compactly describe a possibility distribution imposed by
clausal programs we will thus, for the remainder of this section and for Section 5,
take a valuation V to be a ClauseP → [0, 1] mapping. As before, a valuation V
corresponds with the set of constraints
{
N(e) ≥ λ | eλ ∈ V
}
. The set notation for
valuations and the notations V λ and V λ are extended as usual. Entailment for
valuations is defined as in possibilistic logic, i.e. if we consider the least specific
possibility distribution piV satisfying the constraints
{
NV (e) ≥ λ | eλ ∈ V
}
then
V |= pλ with ‘p’ a proposition iff NV (p) ≥ λ. In particular, recall from possibilistic
logic the inference rules (GMP) or graded modus ponens, i.e. we can infer from
N(α) ≥ λ and N(α → β) ≥ λ′ that N(β) ≥ min(λ, λ′). In addition recall the
inference rule (S), i.e. we can infer from N(α) ≥ λ that N(α) ≥ λ′ with λ ≥ λ′.
Definition 9
A possibilistic (positive) clausal program is a set of possibilistic (positive) clausal
rules, which are pairs p = (r, λ) with r a (positive) clausal rule and λ ∈ ]0, 1] a
certainty associated with r.
We define P ∗ and the λ-cut Pλ as usual.
We are now almost able to define the semantics of weak disjunction. In the previ-
ous sections we guessed a valuation and used this valuation to deal with negation-
as-failure. However, for clausal programs, a new problem arises. Note that the least
specific possibility distribution that satisfies the constraints N(a ∨ b ∨ c) = 1 and
N(¬b) = 1 is also the least specific possibility distribution that satisfies the con-
straints N(a ∨ c) and N(¬b). As such, if ClauseP = {(a ∨ b ∨ c), (¬b), (a ∨ c)},
there would not be a unique valuation that can be used to define this least specific
possibility distribution. Indeed, a valuation uniquely defines a possibility distri-
bution, but not vice versa. To avoid such ambiguity, we will instead immediately
guess a possibility distribution piV and use this possibility distribution to deal with
negation-as-failure in a clausal program.
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Definition 10
Let P be a possibilistic clausal program and let piV be a possibility distribution.
For every p ∈ P , the constraint γwπV (p) induced by p = (r, λ) with λ ∈ ]0, 1],
r = (e0 ← e1, ..., em, not em+1, ..., not en) and piV under the weak possibilistic
semantics is given by
N(e0) ≥ min(N(e1), ..., N(em), 1−NV (em+1), ..., 1−NV (en), λ). (10)
Cw(P,πV ) =
{
γwπV (p) | p ∈ P
}
is the set of constraints imposed by program P and piV ,
and Sw(P,πV ) is the set of all minimally specific possibilistic models of C
w
(P,πV )
.
Whenever P is a possibilistic (positive) clausal program, i.e. whenever P is a
possibilistic clausal program without negation-as-failure, (10) is independent of piV
and we simplify the notation to γw, CwP and S
w
P .
Definition 11
Let P be a possibilistic clausal program. Let piV be a possibility distribution such
that piV ∈ Sw(P,πV ). We then say that piV is a possibilistic answer set of P .
As already indicated we can also use a valuation V to concisely describe piV . When
we say that V is a possibilistic answer set of the clausal program P we are, more
precisely, stating that the possibility distribution induced by V is a possibilistic
answer set of the clausal program P .
Lemma 2
Let P be a possibilistic positive clausal program. Then Sw(P,πV ) is a singleton,
i.e. pi ∈ Sw(P,πV ) is a least specific possibility distribution.
Proof
This readily follows from the form of the constraints imposed by the rules p ∈ P
and since a possibilistic positive clausal program is free of negation-as-failure.
Example 9
Consider the possibilistic clausal program P with the rules:
1 : a ∨ c ∨ d←
0.4 :¬d←
0.8 : e← not (a ∨ b ∨ c).
We have that Cw(P,πV ) is the set of constraints:
N(a ∨ c ∨ d) ≥ 1
N(¬d) ≥ 0.4
N(e) ≥ min(1−NV (a ∨ b ∨ c), 0.8).
We can rewrite the first constraint as N(¬d → a ∨ c) ≥ 1. Given the second
constraint N(¬d) ≥ 0.4 we can apply the inference rule (GMP) to conclude that
N(a∨ c) ≥ 0.4. From propositional logic we know that (a∨ c)→ (a∨ b∨ c), i.e. we
also have N(a ∨ b ∨ c) ≥ 0.4.
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For piV to be an answer set of P we know from Definition 11 that we must have
that pi ∈ Sw(P,πV ) with pi = piV . In other words, we must have that NV (a ∨ b ∨ c) =
N(a ∨ b ∨ c) ≥ 0.4. Due to the principle of least specificity, which implies that
N(a ∨ b ∨ c) = 0.4, the last constraints can be simplified toN(e) ≥ min(1− 0.4, 0.8)
or N(e) ≥ 0.6. As such, the least specific possibility distribution defined by the
constraints N(e) ≥ 0.6, N(a ∨ c ∨ d) ≥ 1 and N(¬d) ≥ 0.4 is a possibilistic answer
set of P .
Notice that we implicitly defined the possibilistic answer set of the previous ex-
ample as a valuation, i.e. in terms of clauses that appear in the head. Alternatively
we could thus write that V =
{
e0 .6 , a ∨ b ∨ d1 ,¬b0 .4
}
defines the possibilistic an-
swer set of P . This idea will be further developed in Section 4.2.2 to avoid the need
to explicitly define a possibility distribution (which would require an exponential
amount of space) and instead rely on an encoding of a possibility distribution by a
(polynomial) set of weighted clauses.
For the crisp case, we only want clauses that are either entirely certain or com-
pletely uncertain, i.e. true or false. To this end, we add the constraint (11), which
is similar to (4) from Proposition 3.
Definition 12
Let P be a clausal program and piV ∈ Sw(P,πV ) a possibility distribution such that
∀ω ∈ Ω · piV (ω) ∈ {0, 1} (11)
then piV is called an answer set of P .
4.2.2 Syntactic Characterization
We now introduce a syntactic counterpart of the semantics for weak disjunction by
defining an immediate consequence and reduct operator. As such, it is more in line
with the classical Gelfond-Lifschitz approach. In addition, the syntactic approach
only needs polynomial size (as we will only consider clauses appearing in the head of
the clausal rules). Indeed, what we will do is formalise the idea of using a valuation
to determine the possibilistic answer sets of a clausal program, rather than relying
on an exponential possibility distribution.
Definition 13
Let P be a possibilistic positive clausal program. We define the immediate conse-
quence operator TwP as:
TwP (V )(e0) = max
{
λ ∈ [0, 1] | (e0 ← e1, ..., em) ∈ Pλ and ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} · V
λ |= ei
}
.
We use P ⋆w to denote the fixpoint which is obtained by repeatedly applying T
w
P
starting from the minimal clausal valuation V = ∅, i.e. the least fixpoint of TwP
w.r.t. set inclusion. When P is a positive clausal program we take λ ∈ {0, 1}.
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Example 10
Consider the clausal program P with the clausal rules
1 : a ∨ b ∨ c←
0.4 :¬b←
0.8 : e← (a ∨ c ∨ d).
We can easily verify that, starting from V = ∅, we obtain
TwP (V )(a ∨ b ∨ c) = 1 and
TwP (V )(¬b) = 0.4.
In the next iteration we furthermore find that
TwP (T
w
P (V ))(e) = 0.4
since (0.8: e ← (a ∨ c ∨ d)) ∈ P0.4 and since (TwP (V ))
0.4 |= a ∨ c ∨ d. In addition,
this is the least fixpoint, i.e. we have P ⋆w =
{
(a ∨ b ∨ c)1 ,¬b0 .4 , e0 .4
}
.
Notice that this definition of the immediate consequence operator is a gener-
alization of the immediate consequence operator for possibilistic simple programs
(see Definition 1). Indeed, for a possibilistic positive clausal program where all
clauses contain only a single literal, i.e. a possibilistic simple program, we have that
P ⋆ = P ⋆w. In addition, when all clauses contain only a single literal, we can simplify
the immediate consequence operator and simply write ei ∈ V
λ instead of V λ |= ei.
We now show that the fixpoint obtained from the immediate consequence operator
TwP is indeed the answer set of P .
Proposition 7
Let P be a possibilistic positive clausal program without possibilistic constraint
rules. Then P ⋆w is a possibilistic answer set of P .
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 6–7.
Thus far, we only considered possibilistic positive clausal programs. If we allow
for negation-as-failure, we will also need to generalize the notion of a reduct. As
usual, in the classical case we want that an expression of the form ‘not e’ is true
when ‘e’ cannot be entailed. Furthermore, since we are working in the possibilistic
case, we want to take the degrees into account when determining the reduct.
Definition 14
Given a possibilistic clausal program P and a valuation V , the reduct PV of P
w.r.t. V is defined as:
PV = { ((e0 ← e1, ..., em),min(λrule , λbody)) | min(λrule , λbody) > 0
∧ λbody = max
{
λ | ∀i ∈ {m+ 1, ..., n} · V 1−λ 6|= ei, λ ∈ [0, 1]
}
∧ ((e0 ← e1, ..., em, not em+1, ..., not en), λrule) ∈ P}
This definition corresponds with the Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct when we consider
crisp clausal programs where each clause consists of exactly one literal. Indeed, if
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we consider clauses with exactly one literal, we could simplify ∀i ∈ {m+ 1, ..., n} ·
V 1−λ 6|= ei to {em+1, ..., en} ∩ V 1−λ = ∅. This new reduct generalises the Gelfond-
Lifschitz reduct in two ways. Firstly, we now have clauses, i.e. we now need to verify
whether the negative body is not entailed by our guess. Secondly, we need to take
the weights attached to the rules, which we interpret as certainties, into account.
In particular, the certainty of the reduct of a rule is limited by the certainty of the
negative body of the rule and the certainty of the rule itself. In the crisp case these
certainty degrees would become trivial.
Proposition 8
A valuation E is a possibilistic answer set of the possibilistic clausal program P
without possibilistic constraint rules iff E is a possibilistic answer set of PE .
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 7.
Before we discuss the complexity results, we look at an example to further uncover
the intuition of clausal programs.
Example 11
Consider the possibilistic clausal program P with the following rules:
0.7 :a ∨ b ∨ c← 0.2 :¬b← 1 : d← not (a ∨ c ∨ f) 1 : e← not c.
The reduct PV with V =
{
(a ∨ b ∨ c)0 .7 , (¬b)0 .2 , d0 .8 , e1
}
is then:
0.7 :a ∨ b ∨ c← 0.2 :¬b← 0.8 : d← 1 : e←
since V 1−0.8 |= a ∨ c but V 1−0.8 6|= a ∨ c and V 1−1 6|= c. We then have that
(PV )
⋆
w =
{
(a ∨ b ∨ c)0 .7 , (¬b)0 .2 , d0 .8 , e1
}
, hence V is indeed an answer set of P .
5 Complexity Results
Before we discuss the complexity results of the weak possibilistic semantics for
disjunctive rules (Section 4.2), we first look at the complexity results of both pos-
sibilistic normal programs (Section 3.2) and the strong possibilistic semantics for
disjunctive rules (Section 4.1). As such, for Proposition 9, 10, 11 and 12 we once
again consider a valuation V for a possibilistic normal/disjunctive program P as
a V : LitP → [0, 1] mapping. We find that for possibilistic normal programs the
addition of weights does not affect the complexity compared to classical normal
programs.
Proposition 9 (possibilistic normal program; brave reasoning)
Let P be a possibilistic normal program. The problem of deciding whether there
exists a possibilistic answer set V of P such that V (l) ≥ λ is NP-complete.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 8.
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Proposition 10 (possibilistic normal program; cautious reasoning)
Let P be a possibilistic normal program. The problem of deciding whether for all
possibilistic answer sets V of P we have that V (l) ≥ λ is coNP-complete.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 9.
Similarly, we find for possibilistic disjunctive programs under the strong disjunc-
tive semantics that the addition of weights does not affect the complexity compared
to classical disjunctive programs.
Proposition 11 (possibilistic disjunctive program; brave reasoning)
Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive program. The problem of deciding whether there
is a possibilistic answer set V such that V (l) ≥ λ is a ΣP2 -complete problem.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 9-10.
Proposition 12 (possibilistic disjunctive program; cautious reasoning)
Let P be a possibilistic disjunctive program. The problem of deciding whether for
all possibilistic answer sets V we have that V (l) ≥ λ is a ΠP2 -complete problem.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 10-11.
We now look at the complexity of the weak possibilistic semantics for disjunctive
rules for a variety of decision problems and under a variety of restrictions. In par-
ticular, throughout this section we look at the complexity of weak disjunction in
the crips case that allows us to compare these results against the complexity of
the related decision problems in classical ASP and other epistemic extensions of
ASP, e.g. (Truszczyn´ski 2011; Vlaeminck et al. 2012). As we will see, for certain
classes of clausal programs, decision problems exist where weak disjunction is com-
putationally less complex than disjunctive programs while remaining more complex
than normal programs.
An overview of the complexity results available in the literature for disjunctive
programs as well as the new results for weak disjunction (in the crisp case) which
we discuss in the remainder of this section can be found in Table 1.
Proposition 13 (weak disjunction, positive clausal program; brave reasoning)
Let P be a positive clausal program. The problem of deciding whether a clause ‘e’
is entailed by a consistent answer set E of P is BH2-hard.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 11-12.
Proposition 14 (weak disjunction, positive clausal program; brave reasoning)
Let P be a positive clausal program. The problem of deciding whether a clause ‘e’
is entailed by a consistent answer set M of P is in BH2.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 12-13.
Corollary 1
Let P be a positive clausal program. The problem of deciding whether a clause ‘e’
is entailed by a consistent answer set E of P is BH2-complete.
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Table 1. Completeness results for the main reasoning tasks with references
no NAF, no ¬ existence brave reasoning cautious reasoning
strong disjunction NP (1) ΣP2
(1)
coNP
(1)
weak disjunction P (6) P (6) P (6)
no NAF, ¬ existence brave reasoning cautious reasoning
strong disjunction NP (1) ΣP2
(1)
coNP
(1)
weak disjunction NP (4) BH2
(3)
coNP
(5)
NAF, ¬ existence brave reasoning cautious reasoning
strong disjunction ΣP2
(2) ΣP2
(2) ΠP2
(2)
weak disjunction ΣP2
(8) ΣP2
(7) ΠP2
(9)
“no NAF” (resp. “no ¬”) indicates results for programs without negation-as-failure (resp. classical negation)
(1) (Eiter and Gottlob 1993) (6) Proposition 15
(2) (Baral 2003) (7) Proposition 16 and 17
(3) Proposition 13 and 14 (8) Corollary 5
(4) Corollary 2 (9) Corollary 6
(5) Corollary 3
Corollary 2 (weak disjunction, positive clausal program; answer set existence)
Determining whether a positive clausal program P has a consistent answer set is
an NP-complete problem.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 14.
Corollary 3 (weak disjunction, positive clausal program; cautious reasoning)
Cautious reasoning, i.e. determining whether a clause ‘e’ is entailed by every answer
set M of a positive clausal program P is coNP-complete.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 14.
Surprisingly, the expressivity of positive clausal programs under the weak inter-
pretation of disjunction is directly tied to the ability to use classical negation in
clauses. If we limit ourselves to positive clausal programs without classical negation
we find that the expressiveness is restricted to P.
In order to see this, let us take a closer look at the immediate consequence opera-
tor for clausal programs as defined in Definition 13. When there are no occurrences
of classical negation we can simplify this immediate consequence operator to
TwP (E) = {e0 | e0 ← e1, ..., em ∈ P ∧ ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m} · ∃e ∈ E · e ⊆ ei}
where e ⊆ ei is defined as the subset relation where we interpret e and ei as sets of
literals, i.e. e = (l1 ∨ ... ∨ ln) is interpreted as {l1, ..., ln}.
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Proposition 15
Let P be a positive clausal program without classical negation. We can find the
unique answer set of P in polynomial time.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 14.
We now examine the complexity of general clausal programs. We will do this by
showing that the problem of determining the satisfiability of a QBF of the form
φ = ∃X1∀X2 · p(X1, X2) with p(X1, X2) in DNF can be reduced to the problem of
determining whether a clause ‘e’ is entailed by a consistent answer set M of the
clausal program P . We start with the definition of our reduction.
Definition 15
Let φ = ∃X1∀X2 · p(X1, X2) be a QBF with p(X1, X2) = θ1 ∨ ... ∨ θn a formula in
disjunctive normal form with Xi sets of variables. We define the clausal program
Pφ corresponding to φ as
Pφ = {x← not ¬x | x ∈ X1} ∪ {¬x← not x | x ∈ X1} (12)
∪ {¬θt ∨ sat← | 1 ≤ t ≤ n} (13)
∪ {← not sat} (14)
with ¬θt the clausal representation of the negation of the formula θt, e.g. when
θt = x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ ... ∧ ¬xk then ¬θt = ¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ... ∨ xk.
Example 12
Given the QBF φ = ∃p1, p2∀q1, q2 · (p1 ∧ q1) ∨ (p2 ∧ q2) ∨ (¬q1 ∧ ¬q2) the clausal
program Pφ is
p1 ← not ¬p1
¬p1 ← not p1
p2 ← not ¬p2
¬p2 ← not p2
¬p1 ∨ ¬q1 ∨ sat ←
¬p2 ∨ ¬q2 ∨ sat ←
q1 ∨ q2 ∨ sat ←
← not sat .
Notice how M = {p1, p2,¬p1 ∨ ¬q1 ∨ sat ,¬p2 ∨ ¬q2 ∨ sat , q1 ∨ q2 ∨ sat} is an an-
swer set of Pφ and that M |= sat . Accordingly we find that the QBF is satisfied.
If we take the QBF φ′ = ∃p1, p2∀q1, q2 · (p1 ∧ q1) ∨ (p2 ∧ q2) then the clausal
program Pφ′ corresponding to φ
′ is the program Pφ in which the penultimate rule
has been removed. Notice how Pφ′ has no answer sets, because we are not able to
entail ‘sat ’ from any of the answer sets of Pφ′ . Indeed, the QBF φ
′ is not satisfiable.
Proposition 16 (weak disjunction; brave reasoning)
Let P be a clausal program. The problem of deciding whether a clause ‘e’ is entailed
by a consistent answer set M of P is ΣP2 -hard.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 14-15.
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Proposition 17 (weak disjunction; brave reasoning)
Let P be a clausal program. The problem of deciding whether a clause ‘e’ is entailed
by a consistent answer set M of P is in ΣP2 .
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 15.
Corollary 4
Let P be a clausal program. The problem of deciding whether a clause ‘e’ is entailed
by a consistent answer set E of P is ΣP2 -complete.
Corollary 5 (weak disjunction; answer set existence)
Determining whether a clausal program P has a consistent answer set is an ΣP2 -
complete problem.
The proof is given in the online appendix of the paper, pp. 15.
Corollary 6 (weak disjunction; cautious reasoning)
Cautious reasoning, i.e. determining whether a clause ‘e’ is entailed by every answer
set M of a clausal program P , is ΠP2 -complete.
Proof
This problem is complementary to brave reasoning, i.e. we verify that there does
not exist an answer set M ′ of P such that ‘¬e’ is entailed by M ′.
6 Related Work
The work presented in this paper touches on various topics that have been the
subject of previous research. In this section we structure our discussion of related
existing work along 3 main lines. Previous work on the semantics of disjunctive
programs is discussed in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2 we look at how ASP and pos-
sibility theory have been used in the literature for epistemic reasoning. Finally, in
Section 6.3, we look at prior work on characterizing rules with possibility theory
and fuzzy logic.
6.1 Semantics of Disjunctive Programs
Many characterizations of stable models have been proposed in the literature. We
refer the reader to (Lifschitz 2010) for a concise overview of thirteen such defini-
tions. One of the earliest characterizations of stable models was in terms of au-
toepistemic logic (Moore 1985). Formulas in autoepistemic logic are constructed
using atoms and propositional connectives, as well as the modal operator L, which
intuitively stands for “it is believed”. The characterization of stable models pro-
posed in (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) based on autoepistemic logic is to look at
‘not a’ as the expression ‘¬La’, a choice which clearly stands out for its sim-
plicity and intuitively. For example, to explain the semantics of the rule a0 ←
a1, ..., am, not am+1, ..., not an one would consider the formula a1∧...∧am∧¬Lam+1∧
... ∧ ¬Lan → a0. Yet this characterization does have some problems. Indeed, it
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was soon afterwards realized that this correspondence does not hold for programs
with classical negation or disjunction in the head. A more involved characterization
based on autoepistemic logic that does work for classical negation and disjunction
has been proposed in (Lifschitz and Schwarz 1993). The idea is to look at literals
‘l’ that are not preceded by negation as failure as the formula (l∧Ll), while one still
looks at a literal of the form ‘not l’ as the formula ¬Ll. In our approach, an expres-
sion of the form ‘not l’ is essentially identified with Π(¬l), which clearly resembles
the first characterization in terms of autoepistemic logic. By staying closer to the
Gelfond-Lifschitz reduct, our approach is more elegant in that we do not require a
special translation of literals in order to be able to deal with classical negation and
disjunction.
Several authors have already proposed alternatives and extensions to the seman-
tics of disjunctive programs. Ordered disjunction (Brewka 2002) falls in the latter
category and allows to use the head of the rule to formulate alternative solutions
in their preferred order. For example, a rule such as l1 × ... × lk ← represents the
knowledge that l1 is preferred over l2 which is preferred over l3 . . . , but that at
the very least we want lk to be true. As such it allows for an easy way to express
context dependent preferences. The semantics of ordered disjunction allow certain
non-minimal models to be answer sets, hence, unlike the work in this paper, it does
not adhere to the standard semantics of disjunctive rules in ASP.
Annotated disjunctions are another example of a framework that changes the
semantics of disjunctive programs (Vennekens et al. 2004). It is based on the idea
that every disjunct in the head of a rule is annotated with a probability. Interest-
ingly, both ordered and annotated disjunction rely on split programs, as found in
the possible model semantics (Sakama and Inoue 1994). These semantics provide
an alternative to the minimal model semantics. The idea is to split a disjunctive
program into a number of normal programs, one for each possible choice of disjuncts
in the head, of which the minimal Herbrand models are then the possible models of
the disjunctive programs. Intuitively this means that a possible model represents
a set of atoms for which a possible justification is present in the program. In line
with our conclusions for weak disjunction, using the possible model semantics also
leads to a lower computational complexity.
Not all existing extensions of disjunction allow non-minimal models. For example,
in (Buccafurri et al. 2002) an extension of disjunctive logic programs is presented
which adds the idea of inheritance. Conflicts between rules are then resolved in
favor of more specific rules. Such an approach allows for an intuitive way to deal
with default reasoning and exceptions. In particular, the semantics allow for rules
to be marked as being defeasible and allows to specify an order or inheritance tree
among (sets of) rules. Interestingly, the complexity of the resulting system is not
affected and coincides with the complexity of ordinary disjunctive programs.
6.2 Epistemic Reasoning with ASP and Possibility Theory
In (Gelfond 1991) it was argued that classical ASP, while later proven to have strong
epistemic foundations (Loyer and Straccia 2006), is not well-suited for epistemic
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reasoning. Specifically, ASP lacks mechanisms for introspection and can thus not
be used to e.g. reason based on cautiously deducible information. At the same
time, however, it was shown that extensions of ASP could be devised that do
allow for a natural form of epistemic reasoning. The language ASPK proposed
in (Gelfond 1991) allows for modal atoms, e.g. Ka, where K is a modal operator
that can intuitively be read as “it is known that [a is true]”. These new modal
atoms can in turn be used in the body of rules. The semantics of ASPK were
originally based on a three-valued interpretation (to allow for the additional truth
value ‘uncertain’), but later, in (Truszczyn´ski 2011), it was shown that this is not
essential and that a more classical two-valued possible world structure can also be
considered. In addition, further extensions are discussed that allow for epistemic
reasoning over arbitrary theories, where it is shown that ASPK can be encoded
within these extensions. The complexity is studied for these extensions and is shown
to be brought up one level w.r.t. ASP, e.g. to ΣP3 for disjunctive epistemic programs.
Alternatively, existing extensions of ASP can be used to implement some epis-
temic reasoning tasks, such as reasoning based on brave/cautious conclusions. This
idea is proposed in (Faber and Woltran 2009) to overcome the need for an inter-
mediary step to compute the desired consequences of the ASP program P1, before
being fed into P2. Rather, they propose a translation to manifold answer set pro-
grams, which exploit the concept of weak constraints (Buccafurri et al. 2000) to
allow for such programs to access all desired consequences of P1 within a single
answer set. As such, for problems that can be cast into this particular form, only
a single ASP program needs to be evaluated and the intermediary step is made
obsolete.
As we mentioned in Section 6.1, the semantics of ASP can also be expressed in
terms of autoepistemic logic (Marek and Truszczyn´ski 1991). These semantics have
the benefit of making the modal operator explicit, allowing for an extensions of ASP
that incorporates such explicit modalities to better express exactly which form of
knowledge is required. However, since autoepistemic logic treats negation-as-failure
as a modality, it is quite hard to extend to the uncertain case. Furthermore, as
already discussed, it as shown in (Lifschitz and Schwarz 1993) that this characteri-
zation does not allow us to treat classical negation or disjunctive rules in a natural
way, which weakens its position as a candidate for generalizing ASP from normal
programs to e.g. disjunctive programs.
Possibility theory, which can e.g. be used for belief revision, has a strong epistemic
notion and shares a lot of commonalities with epistemic entrenchments (Dubois and Prade 1991).
Furthermore, in (Dubois et al. 2012) a generalization of possibilistic logic is stud-
ied, which corresponds to a weighted version of a fragment of the modal logic KD.
In this logic, epistemic states are represented as possibility distributions, and logical
formulas are used to express constraints on possible epistemic states. In this paper,
we similarly interpret rules in ASP as constraints on possibility distributions, which
furthermore allows us to unearth the semantics of weak disjunction.
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6.3 Characterization of Rules using Possibility Theory and Fuzzy Logic
A large amount of research has focused on how possibility distributions can be used
to assign a meaning to rules. For example, possibility theory has been used to model
default rules (Benferhat et al. 1992; Benferhat et al. 1997). Specifically, a default
rule “if a then b” is interpreted as Π(a∧b) > Π(a∧¬b), which captures the intuition
that when a is known to hold, b is more plausible than ¬b, if all that is known is
that a holds. In this approach entailment is defined by looking at the least specific
possibility distributions which is similar in spirit to our approach for characterizing
ASP rules (although the notion of least specific possibility distribution is defined,
in this context, w.r.t. the plausibility ordering on interpretations induced by the
possibility degrees).
The work on possibilistic logic (Dubois et al. 1994) forms the basis of possibilistic
logic programming (Dubois et al. 1991). The idea of possibilistic logic programming
is to start from a necessity-valued knowledge base, which is a finite set of pairs
(φ α), called necessity-valued formulas, with φ a closed first-order formula and
α ∈ [0, 1]. Semantically, a necessity-valued formula expresses a constraint of the
form N(φ) ≥ α on the set of possibility distributions. A possibilistic logic program
is then a set of necessity-valued implications. As rules are essentially modelled using
material implication, however, the stable model semantics cannot straightforwardly
be characterized using possibilistic logic programming. For example, the knowledge
base {(a→ b 1), (¬b 1)}, which represents the program {b← a,¬b←}, induces
that N(¬a) = 1. Indeed, the semantics of this knowledge base indicate that Π(a ∧
¬b) = 0 and Π(b) = 0, i.e. we find that Π(a) = 0. In other words: a direct encoding
using possibilistic logic programming allows for contraposition, which is not in
accordance with the stable model semantics.
Rules in logic can also be interpreted as statements of conditional probabil-
ity (Jaynes 2003). In the possibilistic setting this notion has been adapted to the no-
tion of conditional necessity measures. Rules can be then also be modelled in terms
of conditional necessity measures (Benferhat et al. 1997; Dubois and Prade 1997;
Benferhat et al. 2002). The conditional possibility measure Π (ψ | φ) is defined as
the greatest solution to the equation Π(φ∧ψ) = min(Π (ψ | φ) ,Π(φ)) in accordance
with the principle of least specificity. It can be derived mathematically that this
gives us Π (ψ | φ) = 1 if Π(ψ ∧ φ) = Π(φ) and Π (ψ | φ) = Π(ψ ∧ φ) otherwise
whenever Π(φ) > 0. When Π(φ) = 0, then by convention Π (ψ | φ) = 1 for every
ψ 6= ⊥ and Π (⊥ | φ) = 0, otherwise. The conditional necessity measure is defined
as N (ψ | φ) = 1−Π(¬ψ | φ). However, there does not seem to be a straightforward
way to capture the stable model semantics using conditional necessity measures,
especially when classical negation is allowed. Indeed, if we represent the semantics
of the program {b← a,¬b←} as the constraints N (b | a) ≥ 1 and N (¬a | ⊤) ≥ 1.
Using the definition of the conditional necessity measure, the first constraint is
equivalent to 1−Π(¬b | a) ≥ 1, i.e. Π (¬b | a) = 0. The second constraint simplifies
to Π(a) = 0, which, using the convention stated above gives rise to Π (¬b | a) = 1,
clearly a contradictory result to the earlier conclusion that Π (¬b | a) = 0.
The work in (Nicolas et al. 2006) was one of the first papers to explore the idea
36 Kim Bauters et al.
of combining possibility theory with ASP. Rather than defining the semantics of
ASP in terms of constraints on possibility distributions as we did in this paper, the
goal was to allow one to reason with possibilities in ASP programs. In this way
one can associate certainties with the information encoded in an ASP program.
The approach from (Nicolas et al. 2006) upholds the 1-on-1 relationship between
the classical answer sets of a normal program and the possibilistic answer sets,
which brings with it some advantages. One of those advantages is that it allows us
to deal with possibilistic nested programs (Nieves and Lindgren 2012). The work
from Nicolas et al. was later extended to also cover the case of disjunctive ASP
in (Nieves et al. 2013). The latter approach allows us to e.g. capture qualitative
information by considering partially ordered sets, which would not be straightfor-
ward to accomplish in our work. However, the approaches from (Nicolas et al. 2006)
and (Nieves et al. 2013) work by taking a possibilistic ASP program and reducing
it – by ignoring the certainty values – to a possibilistic ASP program without
negation-as-failure. As such, both approaches loose the certainty encoded through
negation-as-failure, since the certainty values are not taken into account.
Possibility theory has also been used to define various semantics of fuzzy if-then
rules (Zadeh 1992). Rather than working with literals, fuzzy if-then rules consider
fuzzy predicates which each have their own universe of discourse. To draw conclu-
sions from a set of fuzzy if-then rules, mechanisms are needed that can produce an
(intuitively acceptable) conclusion from a set of such rules.
Finally, a formal connection also exists between the approach from Section 3 and
the work on residuated logic programs (Dama´sio and Pereira 2001) under the Go¨del
semantics. Both approaches are different in spirit, however, in the same way that
possibilistic logic (which deals with uncertainty or priority) is different from Go¨del
logic (which deals with graded truth). The formal connection is due to the fact
that necessity measures are min-decomposable and disappears as soon as classical
negation or disjunction is considered.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we defined semantics for Possibilistic ASP (PASP), a framework that
combines possibility theory and ASP to allow for reasoning under (qualitative) un-
certainty. These semantics are based on the interpretation of possibilistic rules as
constraints on possibility distributions. We showed how our semantics for PASP
differ from existing semantics for PASP. Specifically, they adhere to a different in-
tuition for negation-as-failure. As such, they can be used to arrive at acceptable
results for problems where the possibilistic answer sets according to the existing
semantics for PASP do not necessarily agree with our intuition of the problem.
In addition, we showed how our semantics for PASP allowed for a new characteri-
zation of ASP. When looking at ASP as a special case of PASP, we naturally recover
the intuition of a rule that the head is certain whenever we are certain that the body
holds. The resulting characterization stays close to the intuition of the stable model
semantics, yet also shares the explicit reference to modalities with autoepistemic
logic. We showed that this characterization not only naturally characterizes normal
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programs, i.e. programs with negation-a-failure, but can also naturally characterize
disjunctive programs and programs with classical negation.
Due to our explicit reference to modalities in the semantics, we are furthermore
able to characterize an alternative semantics for disjunction in the head of a rule
that has a more epistemic flavour than the standard treatment of disjunction in
ASP, i.e. given a rule of the form (a ∨ b ←) we do not obtain two answer sets,
but rather we have ‘a ∨ b’ as-is in the answer set. While such a characterization
might seem weak, we showed that the interplay with literals significantly affects the
expressiveness. Indeed, we found that the problem of brave reasoning/cautious rea-
soning under these weak semantics for disjunction for a program without negation-
as-failure, but with classical negation, is BH2-complete and coNP-complete, respec-
tively. This highlights that weak disjunction is not merely syntactic sugar, i.e. it
cannot simply be simulated in normal ASP without causing an exponential blow-up.
For strong disjunction, on the other hand, we have obtained that brave and cau-
tious reasoning without negation-as-failure are ΣP2 -complete and coNP-complete,
respectively. As such, the weak semantics for disjunction detailed in this paper al-
low us to work with disjunction in a less complex way that still remains non-trivial.
If, however, we restrict ourselves to atoms, then brave reasoning under the weak
semantics for disjunction is P-complete.
References
Banerjee, M. and Dubois, D. 2009. A simple modal logic for reasoning about revealed
beliefs. In Proceedings of the 10th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative
Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (ECSQARU’09). 805–816.
Baral, C. 2003. Knowledge, Representation, Reasoning and Declarative Problem Solving.
Cambridge University Press.
Bauters, K., Schockaert, S., De Cock, M., and Vermeir, D. 2010. Possibilistic
answer set programming revisited. In Proceedings of the 26th Conference on Uncertainty
in Artificial Intelligence (UAI).
Bauters, K., Schockaert, S., De Cock, M., and Vermeir, D. 2011. Weak and strong
disjunction in possibilistic ASP. In Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on
Scalable Uncertainty Management (SUM).
Benferhat, S., Dubois, D., Garcia, L., and Prade, H. 2002. On the transformation
between possibilistic logic bases and possibilistic causal networks. International Journal
of Approximate Reasoning 29, 2, 135–173.
Benferhat, S., Dubois, D., and Prade, H. 1992. Representing default rules in pos-
sibilistic logic. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Principles of
Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR). 673–684.
Benferhat, S., Dubois, D., and Prade, H. 1997. Nonmonotonic reasoning, conditional
objects and possibility theory. Artificial Intelligence 92, 1–2, 259–276.
Brewka, G. 2002. Logic programming with ordered disjunction. In Proceedings of the
18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). 100–105.
Buccafurri, F., Faber, W., and Leone, N. 2002. Disjunctive logic programs with
inheritance. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 2, 3, 293–321.
Buccafurri, F., Leone, N., and Rullo, P. 2000. Enhancing disjunctive datalog by
constraints. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering 12, 5, 845–860.
38 Kim Bauters et al.
Cai, J.-Y.,Gundermann, T., Hartmanis, J., Hemachandra, L., Sewelson, V.,Wag-
ner, K., and Wechsung, G. 1988. The boolean hierarchy I: Structural properties.
SIAM Journal on Computing 17, 6, 1232–1252.
Dama´sio, C. V. and Pereira, L. M. 2001. Monotonic and residuated logic programs.
In ECSQARU ’01: Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Symbolic and Quan-
titative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty. 748–759.
Dubois, D., Lang, J., and Prade, H. 1991. Towards possibilistic logic programming.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP). 581–
595.
Dubois, D., Lang, J., and Prade, H. 1994. Possibilistic logic. Handbook of Logic for
Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming 3, 1, 439–513.
Dubois, D. and Prade, H. 1991. Epistemic entrenchment and possibilistic logic. Artificial
Intelligence 50, 2, 223–239.
Dubois, D. and Prade, H. 1997. A synthetic view of belief revision with uncertain
inputs in the framework of possibility theory. International Journal of Approximate
Reasoning 17, 2-3, 295–324.
Dubois, D., Prade, H., and Schockaert, S. 2012. Stable models in generalized possi-
bilistic logic. Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Principles of Knowl-
edge Representation and Reasoning (KR’12), 519–529.
Eiter, T. and Gottlob, G. 1993. Complexity results for disjunctive logic programming
and application to nonmonotonic logics. In Proceedings of the 1993 International Logic
Programming Symposium (ILPS). 266–278.
Faber, W. and Woltran, S. 2009. Manifold answer-set programs for meta-reasoning.
In LPNMR. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5753. Springer, 115–128.
Gelfond, M. 1987. On stratified autoepistemic theories. In Proceedings of the 6th Na-
tional Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). 207–211.
Gelfond, M. 1991. Strong introspection. In Proceedings of the 9th National conference
on Artificial intelligence (AAAI’91). 386–391.
Gelfond, M. and Lifschitz, V. 1991. Classical negation in logic programs and disjunc-
tive databases. New Generation Computing 9, 365–385.
Gelfond, M. and Lifzchitz, V. 1988. The stable model semantics for logic program-
ming. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Logic Programming (ICLP).
1081–1086.
Huth, M. and Ryan, M. 2004. Logic in Computer Science: Modelling and Reasoning
about Systems. Cambridge University Press.
Jaynes, E. 2003. Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge University Press.
Lifschitz, V. 2010. Thirteen definitions of a stable model. In Fields of Logic and Com-
putation. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6300. 488–503.
Lifschitz, V. and Schwarz, G. 1993. Extended logic programs as autoepistemic theo-
ries. In In Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Logic Programming and
Nonmonotonic Reasoning. 101–114.
Loyer, Y. and Straccia, U. 2006. Epistemic foundation of stable model semantics.
Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 6, 4, 355–393.
Marek, W. and Truszczyn´ski, M. 1991. Autoepistemic logic. Journal of the ACM 38,
587–618.
Moore, R. 1985. Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic. Artificial Intelli-
gence 29, 1, 75–94.
Nguyen, L. A. 2005. On the complexity of fragments of modal logics. In Proceedings of
the 5th International Conference on Advances in Modal logic (AiML’05). 249–268.
Characterizing and Extending ASP using Possibility Theory 39
Nicolas, P., Garcia, L., Ste´phan, I., and Lefe`vre, C. 2006. Possibilistic uncertainty
handling for answer set programming. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelli-
gence 47, 1–2, 139–181.
Nieves, J. C. and Lindgren, H. 2012. Possibilistic nested logic programs. In Tech-
nical Communications of the 28th International Conference on Logic Programming
(ICLP’12). 267–276.
Nieves, J. C., Osorio, M., and Corte´s, U. 2013. Semantics for possibilistic disjunctive
programs. Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 13, 1, 33–70.
Papadimitriou, C. 1994. Computational complexity. Addison-Wesley.
Pearce, D. 1997. A new logical characterization of stable models and answer sets. In
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Extensions of Logic
Programming (NMELP). Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1216. 57–70.
Sakama, C. and Inoue, K. 1994. An alternative approach to the semantics of disjunctive
logic programs and deductive databases. Journal of Automated Reasoning 13, 1, 145–
172.
Truszczyn´ski, M. 2011. Revisiting epistemic specifications. In Logic Programming,
Knowledge Representation, and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 6565. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 315–333.
Vennekens, J., Verbaeten, S., and Bruynooghe, M. 2004. Logic programs with
annotated disjunctions. In Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Logic
Programming (ICLP). Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3132. 431–445.
Vlaeminck, H., Vennekens, J., Bruynooghe, M., and Denecker, M. 2012. Or-
dered epistemic logic: Semantics, complexity and applications. In Principles of Knowl-
edge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference
(KR’12).
Zadeh, L. 1992. Fuzzy logic and the calculus of fuzzy if-then rules. In Proceedings of the
22nd IEEE International Symposium on Multiple-Valued Logic (ISMVL). 480–480.
